{
  "id": "evidence-map",
  "title": "International evidence on intermediaries and tax compliance",
  "chartNumber": null,
  "report": {
    "title": "Smuggling: The Role of the State and E-commerce Platforms",
    "publisher": "Insight LAC",
    "authors": [
      "Ana Basco",
      "Paula Garnero",
      "Lautaro Ramirez"
    ],
    "url": "https://estudios.insightlac.com"
  },
  "sources": [
    {
      "organization": "Insight LAC, elaboración propia (Tabla 2)",
      "publication": "Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce",
      "year": 2026
    }
  ],
  "provenance": "verified",
  "note": null,
  "url": "https://estudios.insightlac.com/ecommerce/en/#evidencia-intermediarios",
  "attribution": "Source: Insight LAC, “Smuggling: The Role of the State and E-commerce Platforms”",
  "columns": [
    "Place",
    "Study",
    "What was done",
    "Main result",
    "Link"
  ],
  "rows": [
    [
      "Denmark",
      "Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen y Saez (2011) Econometrica, 79(3), 651–692.",
      "Randomized tax audit experiment covering more than 40,000 individual taxpayers. Evasion rates were compared by type of income reported.",
      "The evasion rate for income subject to reporting by an independent third party is close to zero. For self-reported income it is substantially higher. The difference does not depend on the taxpayer's ethical preferences but on the information architecture of the system: when there is a third party that reports, the taxpayer cannot sustain an inconsistent return without being automatically exposed.",
      "https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9113"
    ],
    [
      "Chile",
      "Pomeranz (2015) American Economic Review, 105(8), 2539–2569.",
      "Field experiment covering more than 400,000 firms. The effect of the VAT paper trail on tax compliance along the production chain was analysed.",
      "The paper trail that firms require from one another in order to claim tax credits generates compliance effects along the chain. The effect weakens at the last link (sale to the final consumer) because the buyer has no direct incentive to ask for an invoice, which creates a structural break in traceability at that stage.",
      "https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130393"
    ],
    [
      "Brazil",
      "Naritomi (2019) American Economic Review, 109(9), 3031–3072.",
      "Evaluation of the Nota Fiscal Paulista programme, a tax lottery scheme implemented in São Paulo. Its effect on the revenue reported by firms was measured.",
      "Turning the final consumer into a voluntary verifier of the transaction produced an increase of at least 21% in the revenue reported by firms. The mechanism complements third-party reporting by closing the break at the final link of the chain identified by Pomeranz.",
      "https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160949"
    ],
    [
      "Pakistan",
      "Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn y Waseem (2015) Journal of Political Economy, 123(5), 1071–1115.",
      "Analysis of administrative tax data and tax policy experiments. Turnover-based taxation was compared with profit-based taxation in a context of limited enforcement capacity.",
      "Countries with weak enforcement capacity use turnover-based rather than profit-based taxation precisely so they can rely on third-party reporting, which is observable and verifiable even when net profits are not. The traceability mechanism partly substitutes for direct audit capacity.",
      "https://doi.org/10.1086/683849"
    ],
    [
      "Costa Rica",
      "Brockmeyer y Hernandez (2022) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17716. Centre for Economic Policy Research.",
      "Empirical evidence on the effects of introducing a third-party withholding regime in a developing economy.",
      "The introduction of a third-party withholding regime in Costa Rica produced observable improvements in tax compliance, extending the evidence of the Kleven–Pomeranz line to middle-income economies with developing tax institutions.",
      "https://cepr.org/publications/dp17716"
    ],
    [
      "South Asia",
      "Bussolo, M., Dixit, A., Golla, A., Kotia, A., Lee, J. N., Narasimhan, P. & Sharma, S. (2023). Policy Research Working Paper No. 10306). World Bank.",
      "Survey of firms selling on two e-commerce platforms in South Asia, with different degrees of formalization. The impact of joining the digital channel on the firms' tax and organizational behaviour was analysed, including informal micro and small enterprises.",
      "Joining the digital channel increases firms' incentive to register formally, by increasing their visibility to the tax authorities. Firms that have been on the platform longer are more likely to experience that impact, which suggests that the formalization associated with the digital channel is a cumulative process. It is one of the studies identified in this review that directly measures the effect of e-commerce platforms on the formalization of informal sellers.",
      "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/39393"
    ]
  ]
}