An analysis of transparency and formalization for public policy in Argentina
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Insight LAC · 2026 Report
Keep readingSmuggling and illicit trade gained weight on the public agenda during 2025 and 2026, with industry estimates showing a sharp increase in categories such as mobile phones, growing concern among business chambers about unfair competition, and bills on the liability of intermediaries. This report analyses what role those platforms can play and acknowledges that some macroeconomic factors, such as the easing of currency controls and the appreciation of the peso, widened the price gap with other markets, but it focuses on the opportunities the digital channel offers to make transactions transparent and help reduce smuggling.
Part 1 · Market
34trillion pesos
E-commerce revenue in 2025Source: 1
9%
Real revenue growth in 2025Source: 2
1.3million people
New online buyers in 2025Source: 3
25million people
Online buyers in 2025Source: 4
In 2025, Argentine e-commerce turned over 34,033,238 million pesos, with real growth of close to 9%, and added 1.3 million new buyers to reach a base of 25 million people. The channel grew while brick-and-mortar retail contracted, gaining market share in a year when overall consumption declined. That momentum took place within a heterogeneous ecosystem that includes third-party marketplaces, own-store platforms and conversational channels such as Instagram and WhatsApp, each with very different capacities to record information that can be used for tax purposes. Understanding that heterogeneity is a necessary condition for assessing the role of each actor in the economy.
Part 2 · Informality
With VAT evasion in retail and wholesale trade still among the highest of all measured economic activities, Argentina faces a structural problem that growth cycles have been unable to reverse. Economic informality operates along analytically distinct dimensions (tax, customs, and grey and black markets) that require differentiated policy tools and that e-commerce affects unevenly. The most robust micro-econometric literature available shows that the key driver of tax compliance is not the taxpayer's willingness but the information architecture of the system in which they operate: when a legal regime requires an independent third party to record certain information and report it to the tax authority, there is less room to sustain returns that are inconsistent with that data. Some marketplaces, depending on their architecture and the services they actually provide, can generate records that are relevant for that purpose. However, generating information does not automatically make them parties obliged to report it, withhold taxes or perform enforcement functions: those obligations only exist when an applicable rule expressly establishes them, and within the limits it sets. When it comes to smuggling and grey markets, by contrast, platforms have substantially more limited capacities. Smuggling is a customs phenomenon that, in domestic resale of previously imported goods, may have taken place before the platform ever intervenes, and grey markets may be fostered by distortions in regulatory design (such as tariff gaps and certification or type-approval costs) that listing moderation systems cannot solve on their own. Recognizing that heterogeneity is the necessary condition for building a public policy that makes the most of what the digital channel actually produces without assigning it responsibilities it cannot fulfil.
Part 3 · Public policy
Argentina's digital channel produces traceability that the State already uses through permanent information regimes, tax withholding and collection, and cooperation mechanisms with platforms. This section analyses that regulatory framework, places it within the international comparative debate and proposes four concrete policy lines. The central argument is that smuggling and grey markets are not solved by extending strict or joint liability for third-party conduct to platforms. That approach can blur the division of functions among actors, shift onto private intermediaries enforcement tasks that belong primarily to the State, and have regressive effects on the smallest sellers, without addressing the conditions that make irregular trade possible and profitable. Smuggling is, in essence, a matter of border control and customs intelligence, and its expansion may be fostered by incentives created by regulatory design itself (price gaps, asymmetric tax burdens and type-approval and certification barriers that make the formal channel more expensive). Both dimensions must be addressed at the same time. For the first, the priority is to make better use of the information that existing regimes already produce, linking data from platforms, customs and technical agencies under common interoperability protocols. For the second, the direction is to reduce differential incentives between import regimes, review whether technical requirements are calibrated to the actual risk they seek to mitigate, and promote regional convergence of standards in the categories most affected by irregular trade.
The channel grew while brick-and-mortar retail contracted, gaining market share in a year when overall consumption declined.
Argentina, Chile and Mexico already show penetration close to that of Spain or Australia.
| Country | E-commerce / retail sales (%) | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Netherlands | 32.86 | 2024 |
| Czech Republic | 30.36 | 2024 |
| United Kingdom | 27.2 | 2024 |
| Denmark | 23.88 | 2024 |
| United States | 19.6 | 2024 |
| Germany | 17.6 | 2024 |
| Argentina | 13.82 | 2023 |
| Chile | 12.3 | 2024 |
| Mexico | 12.02 | 2023 |
| Spain | 11.69 | 2024 |
| Australia | 11.4 | 2024 |
| France | 10.34 | 2024 |
| Italy | 10.01 | 2024 |
| Canada | 6 | 2024 |
| Colombia | 5.38 | 2020 |
| Luxembourg | 1.42 | 2024 |
Source: UNCTAD, Banco Central de Chile, INDEC, ARCA y CACE, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: UNCTAD, Banco Central de Chile, INDEC, ARCA y CACE, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Note: the estimate for Argentina tends to overstate the penetration of the digital channel in retail sales. It was built from the weight of the retail channel in total trade and from the sales recorded by AFIP in 2023. In other words, informal trade at physical stalls is left out of the calculation. For more detail, see the methodological note in the Annex. See the full methodology
In current pesos, revenue only goes up. In constant pesos, the 2024 drop and the 2025 recovery become visible.
| Year | Current (million pesos) | Constant (million pesos) |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 102,700 | 13,480,988.413 |
| 2017 | 156,300 | 16,342,011.897 |
| 2018 | 229,760 | 17,889,136.495 |
| 2019 | 403,278 | 20,426,223.48 |
| 2020 | 905,143 | 32,293,231.274 |
| 2021 | 1,520,000 | 36,559,946.865 |
| 2022 | 2,846,000 | 39,723,836.026 |
| 2023 | 7,829,000 | 46,837,502.662 |
| 2024 | 22,025,462 | 41,218,038.174 |
| 2025 | 34,033,238 | 44,886,042.436 |
Source: CACE (series anuales; valor 2025 según Estudio Anual definitivo, marzo de 2026) e INDEC, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: CACE (series anuales; valor 2025 según Estudio Anual definitivo, marzo de 2026) e INDEC, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Note: values in million pesos. Constant June 2026 pesos, deflated with INDEC's CPI (annual average).
After slowing to 16% in 2023 and 3% in 2024, units sold grew 28% in 2025 and reached 645 million.
| Year | Units sold (millones) | Year-on-year change (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 75 | No data |
| 2017 | 96 | 28 |
| 2018 | 120 | 25 |
| 2019 | 146 | 21.667 |
| 2020 | 251 | 71.918 |
| 2021 | 381 | 51.793 |
| 2022 | 422 | 10.761 |
| 2023 | 489 | 15.877 |
| 2024 | 504 | 3.067 |
| 2025 | 645 | 27.976 |
Source: CACE, series anuales, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: CACE, series anuales, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Digital wallets are gaining ground on cash in both channels.
| Payment method | 2019 · E-commerce | 2019 · In-store point of sale | 2024 · E-commerce | 2024 · In-store point of sale | 2030 (proj.) · E-commerce | 2030 (proj.) · In-store point of sale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Digital wallets | 20 % | 4 % | 34 % | 25 % | 48 % | 39 % |
| Transfers (A2A) | 8 % | No data | 14 % | 8 % | 19 % | 17 % |
| BNPL / financing | 0.5 % | No data | 1 % | 1 % | 1 % | 1 % |
| Cryptocurrencies | 0.5 % | No data | 1 % | No data | 2 % | No data |
| Credit cards | 47 % | 28 % | 27 % | 20 % | 18 % | 15 % |
| Debit and prepaid | 10 % | 14 % | 19 % | 21 % | 12 % | 13 % |
| Cash | 16 % | 54 % | 4 % | 25 % | 1 % | 16 % |
Source: Worldpay, The Global Payments Report 2025, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: Worldpay, The Global Payments Report 2025, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Note: share of transaction value. 2030 is a Worldpay projection. "n/a": no data reported by the source. For BNPL and cryptocurrencies in 2019 the source reports "less than 1%" (entered as 0.5%). In e-commerce, "Cash" includes cash on delivery, prepaid and postpaid (e.g. Rapipago, Pago Fácil). Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. The 2019 data match The Global Payments Report 2020, p. 49.
Temu and Shein appear in the first half of 2025, while AliExpress and Amazon lose share and Mercado Libre stays in the lead.
| Platform | 2024 (%) | 2025 (1er semestre) (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Mercado Libre | 37 | 33 |
| AliExpress / Alibaba | 33 | 15 |
| Amazon | 32 | 13 |
| Temu | Not surveyed | 10 |
| Shein | Not surveyed | 8 |
| Tiendamia | 13 | 5 |
Source: CACE, fase de demanda (Informe Anual 2024 y Reporte MID 1er semestre 2025), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: CACE, fase de demanda (Informe Anual 2024 y Reporte MID 1er semestre 2025), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Note: percentage of cross-border buyers who used each platform (multiple answers allowed). "–": platform not surveyed in that period.
Economic informality operates along analytically distinct dimensions (tax, customs, and grey and black markets) that require differentiated policy tools and that e-commerce affects unevenly.
Informality essentially consists of a set of income-generating activities that are not regulated by the State. However, every actor experiences negative consequences from this problem.
Three analytically independent dimensions that overlap in practice. The numbers mark the overlaps stated in the report; tap each dimension to see its categories and the legislation that covers them.
Relationships in the diagram
What it is
Failure to meet registration, invoicing or filing obligations: the economic unit is not registered in the tax regime that corresponds to its activity, remains in a category that does not reflect its level of operations, or fails to meet its invoicing and filing obligations.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
Tax Procedure Law 11,683 (registration and filing obligations before ARCA), Law 24,977 on the Simplified Regime (Monotributo), rules of the General VAT and Income Tax Regime, possibly General Companies Law 19,550
Level in Argentina
VAT evasion went from 60% of potential revenue in 2017 to 42% in 2023. Source: Centro de Estudios Tributarios, Universidad Austral, 2025.
Relationships in the diagram
Smuggling (customs offence)
What it is
Bringing goods in or out through artifice or deception that prevents or hinders control by the customs service: concealment, use of unauthorized crossings, false documentation or other manoeuvres aimed at evading duties, prohibitions or restrictions. What defines smuggling is the intent to evade control, not the type of product: it may involve genuine or counterfeit goods, permitted or prohibited. When the value of the goods does not exceed the threshold set by law, the conduct is treated as minor smuggling and penalized as an administrative infraction, not as a crime.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
Customs Code, Law 22,415, articles 863 to 876 (smuggling offence) and article 947 (minor smuggling)
Customs infractions (customs irregularity)
What it is
Failure to meet customs obligations without the artifice or deception that characterizes smuggling. It includes inaccurate declarations of the quantity, quality, value, origin or tariff classification of goods, failure to meet the conditions of regimes such as temporary importation, and breaches of formal obligations. Under-invoicing, for example, is usually treated as an inaccurate declaration. It may result from error, negligence or deliberate conduct that does not amount to smuggling, and it is penalized administratively, mainly with fines. All smuggling is a customs irregularity, but not every customs irregularity is smuggling.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
Customs Code, Law 22,415, Section XII, Title II (customs infractions), including inaccurate declaration (article 954)
Level in Argentina
Illegal trade accounts for 5.06% of Argentina's GDP. Source: ASIPI, 2025.
Relationships in the diagram
Prohibited or restricted goods (black market)
What it is
Goods whose production, import, possession, distribution or sale is prohibited, or subject to a special control regime for reasons of security, health or public order. The illegality stems from a prohibition or restriction on the product itself, not from the channel through which it is sold or the seller's tax status. Depending on the product, the prohibition may be absolute (the good cannot be sold at all, as with narcotics) or relative (it can only be sold with specific authorizations and through authorized channels, as with firearms or prescription drugs). Lawful goods that do not meet general technical or regulatory requirements, such as type approvals or certifications, are not part of this category.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
Criminal Code; Law 23,737 on narcotics; Law 20,429 on firearms and explosives; Law 16,463 on medicines, as applicable
Counterfeit products (black market)
What it is
Goods that reproduce, imitate or use without authorization trademarks, distinctive signs, designs or other elements protected by intellectual property rights, so that they are presented as, or may be perceived as, original products or products linked to their legitimate owner. Unlike prohibited goods, the type of product may be perfectly lawful: the illegality stems from the counterfeiting, the unauthorized use of third-party rights or the misrepresentation of the origin or authenticity of the good.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
Trademark Law 22,362
Intellectual Property Law 11,723 and Decree-Law 6673/63 on Industrial Models and Designs, as applicable
Sale of genuine products outside official distribution networks (grey market in the strict sense)
What it is
Sale of genuine products outside the distribution networks that are official or authorized by the manufacturer. What makes it "grey" is the sales channel: the product is authentic, but it is sold by actors that are not part of the brand's official distribution network. This dimension is independent of tax, customs and regulatory compliance. A product sold on the grey market may have been imported legally, with the corresponding duties paid, and meet all the technical or health requirements that apply in the local market. At the same time, the grey market may overlap with other forms of irregularity. For example, a genuine product sold outside the official network may have entered through smuggling or may lack the type approval, electrical certification, health registration or other authorization required for its sale.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
There is no specific public regulation: it is governed by private agreements (for example, contracts with official distributors)
Sale of products without regulatory clearance (grey market in the broad sense)
What it is
Often called "grey markets", this covers the sale of genuine products in a lawful category that do not meet one or more of the regulatory requirements for sale in the local market. These requirements may include technical type approvals, safety or energy-efficiency certifications, health registrations or authorizations, mandatory labelling or other conditions set by sector regulation. The irregularity does not stem from the nature of the product or from a general ban on selling it, but from the failure to meet a regulatory condition needed for its legal sale. It also differs from the grey market in the strict sense, since a product can be sold outside the manufacturer's official network and still meet local regulatory requirements, or be sold by an authorized distributor and still show some regulatory non-compliance.
Legislation (non-exhaustive) that includes formality requirements
ENACOM type approval: Argentina Digital Law 27,078 and Resolution 57/2026
Electrical safety certification: SIC Resolution 16/2025
Toy safety certification: Resolutions 163/2005 and 313/2025
Auto parts certification: Law 24,449 and Decree 196/2025
Health authorization for food, supplements and cosmetics: Law 18,284 (Argentine Food Code) and ANMAT regulations
Level in Argentina
The report does not give a level for this dimension.
Registered, but in a grey market. A productive unit may be registered and meet its tax obligations, yet sell products outside the distribution network authorized by the manufacturer, operating in the so-called grey market.
From smuggling to the grey market. …a good that was smuggled in may later be sold through unofficial distribution channels (grey market).
Grey market without smuggling. …a genuine and lawful product may be sold through a grey market without having breached any customs rule when it entered the country.
Source: Insight LAC, elaboración propia (Tabla 1), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: ASIPI, Estudio sobre el impacto de la falsificación y el contrabando en el desarrollo económico y social de América Latina, 2025
What defines smuggling is the intent to evade control, not the type of product: it may involve genuine or counterfeit goods, permitted or prohibited.
ASIPI's estimate of counterfeiting and smuggling, to scale: each square is 1% of Argentina's GDP.
Illegal trade5.06%of Argentina's GDP
Each square is 1% of GDP
With documented impact on sectors such as apparel, electronics and tobacco.
ASIPI estimate (2025) of counterfeiting and smuggling. The report does not state which year it refers to.
When a legal regime requires an independent third party to record certain information and report it to the tax authority, there is less room to sustain returns that are inconsistent with that data.
Unlike a transaction carried out entirely in cash or through an unrecorded channel, some platforms keep data on the activities carried out within their systems, whose scope depends on their architecture and the services they actually provide.
Six studies on the role of intermediaries in third-party tax compliance: five experiments in specific countries and one regional survey, the only one that measures the direct effect of e-commerce platforms.
Main result
The evasion rate for income subject to reporting by an independent third party is close to zero.
For self-reported income it is substantially higher. The difference does not depend on the taxpayer's ethical preferences but on the information architecture of the system: when there is a third party that reports, the taxpayer cannot sustain an inconsistent return without being automatically exposed.
Main result
The paper trail that firms require from one another in order to claim tax credits generates compliance effects along the chain.
The effect weakens at the last link (sale to the final consumer) because the buyer has no direct incentive to ask for an invoice, which creates a structural break in traceability at that stage.
Main result
Countries with weak enforcement capacity use turnover-based rather than profit-based taxation precisely so they can rely on third-party reporting, which is observable and verifiable even when net profits are not.
The traceability mechanism partly substitutes for direct audit capacity.
Main result
Turning the final consumer into a voluntary verifier of the transaction produced an increase of at least 21% in the revenue reported by firms.
The mechanism complements third-party reporting by closing the break at the final link of the chain identified by Pomeranz.
Main result
Joining the digital channel increases firms' incentive to register formally, by increasing their visibility to the tax authorities.
Firms that have been on the platform longer are more likely to experience that impact, which suggests that the formalization associated with the digital channel is a cumulative process. It is one of the studies identified in this review that directly measures the effect of e-commerce platforms on the formalization of informal sellers.
Source: Insight LAC, elaboración propia (Tabla 2), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Taken together, these studies show that regulatory design and the incentive structure are relevant dimensions for explaining irregular trade, although they do not fully account for a phenomenon in which institutional, logistical and criminal factors also play a part.
Each figure measures something different (share, price gap, tax burden, sales channel), so each one gets its own panel, with its unit and source.
Share of smuggling in the mobile phone market
From 7% to 35%
These figures, released through a press article without public access to the full report or its methodology, should be read as industry estimates and not as official or independent statistics.
7%: 2023 · 35%: 2025 · AFARTE, citado en La Nación, 2025
Price gap between the formal and irregular channels for high-end models
Between 30% and 40%
These figures, released through a press article without public access to the full report or its methodology, should be read as industry estimates and not as official or independent statistics.
No reference year in the report · AFARTE, citado en La Nación, 2025
Mobile phones in the country that entered illegally
One third
No reference year in the report · La Nación y El País, 2026
Price of cigarettes in Argentina compared with Paraguay
Up to 3 times more expensive
No reference year in the report · ASIPI, 2025
Taxes as a share of the final price of cigarettes
About 80%
No reference year in the report · ASIPI, 2025
Apparel sold through the Flores and La Salada markets, retail stores, street fairs and street vendors, among others
83%
This is not smuggling: these are sales channels, “most of them not reached by the digitalization of payment methods, outside any traceable framework”.
2022 · Fundar (Ludmer, Schuffer, Schteingart e Isaak), 2023
| Category | Metric | Figure | Period | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile phones | Share of smuggling in the mobile phone market | From 7% to 35% | 7%: 2023 · 35%: 2025 | AFARTE, citado en La Nación, Mercado de celulares en Argentina: estimaciones de contrabando, 2025 |
| Mobile phones | Price gap between the formal and irregular channels for high-end models | Between 30% and 40% | No reference year in the report | AFARTE, citado en La Nación, Mercado de celulares en Argentina: estimaciones de contrabando, 2025 |
| Mobile phones | Mobile phones in the country that entered illegally | One third | No reference year in the report | La Nación y El País, notas del 31 de mayo y del 4 de julio de 2026, 2026 |
| Tobacco | Price of cigarettes in Argentina compared with Paraguay | Up to 3 times more expensive | No reference year in the report | ASIPI, Estudio sobre el impacto de la falsificación y el contrabando en el desarrollo económico y social de América Latina, 2025 |
| Tobacco | Taxes as a share of the final price of cigarettes | About 80% | No reference year in the report | ASIPI, Estudio sobre el impacto de la falsificación y el contrabando en el desarrollo económico y social de América Latina, 2025 |
| Apparel | Apparel sold through the Flores and La Salada markets, retail stores, street fairs and street vendors, among others | 83% | 2022 | Fundar (Ludmer, Schuffer, Schteingart e Isaak), La industria textil-indumentaria en la Argentina del siglo XXI, 2023 |
Source: AFARTE, citado en La Nación, Mercado de celulares en Argentina: estimaciones de contrabando, 2025
Source: La Nación y El País, notas del 31 de mayo y del 4 de julio de 2026, 2026
E-commerce produces traceability as a natural by-product of how it works.
Every digital transaction leaves traces in at least two layers at once. The first is the layer of the transaction itself: the interaction between the parties, whether a listing, a message, a payment or a purchase confirmation, generates records that are stored in the systems of the platform, of the payment service provider and, in many cases, of the telecommunications infrastructure that supports it.
Which type of platform intermediates each sale depending on who sells to whom, and how much of that sale gets recorded.
| Who are the parties involved? | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| What role does the platform play? | B2BBusiness → business | B2CBusiness → consumer | C2CConsumer → consumer |
| MarketplaceIntermediary that does not hold the productHigh traceability | B2BBusiness → business
Traceability
| B2CBusiness → consumer
Traceability
| C2CConsumer → consumer
second-hand and auctions Traceability
|
| Own storeInfrastructure for a seller's own channelMedium traceability | B2BBusiness → business
Traceability
| B2CBusiness → consumer
Traceability
| C2CConsumer → consumer
|
| Conversational channelSocial network or messaging. Transaction outside the platformLow or no traceability | B2BBusiness → business
Traceability
| B2CBusiness → consumer
Traceability
| C2CConsumer → consumer
Traceability
|
The difference between formal e-commerce and informal channels varies according to the type of actor in the digital ecosystem. The analytically correct starting point is to recognize what each architecture produces by design, and from there build the incentives and obligations that correspond to each type of actor, subject to feasible and reasonable limits regarding the information to be provided, the technology available and compliance costs.
Marketplace
High traceability
The traceability of marketplaces.
Depending on their business model, some platforms may hold information on the seller's declared identity, the orders placed, their amounts, dates and payment methods. When they are also involved in processing or settling the payment, they may meet the operational conditions needed to perform advance tax collection functions. However, the technical capacity to do so does not in itself constitute a legal obligation. In Argentina, certain regimes expressly designate some owners or operators of platforms, payment aggregators and payment processors as collection agents, or as parties obliged to report.
Own store
Medium traceability
The traceability of commerce infrastructure platforms.
They know who the seller is insofar as the seller is a customer of their software services, and they record the traffic and transactions that pass through their infrastructure. However, they hold no position whatsoever in the transaction itself. They do not hold the payment, are not party to the contract between buyer and seller and have no visibility into the buyer's tax status. That places them outside the scope of tax withholding schemes in the strict sense.
Conversational channel
Low or no traceability
The traceability of conversational channels.
What these platforms record by design is the communication between the parties, which can range from a post or a message to the coordination of the exchange, but not the actual transaction, which in many cases is carried out outside the platform by bank transfer or in cash.
On these platforms there is no record of the amount transacted, no tax identification of the seller as such and no possibility of withholding taxes. What exists is a trace of the interaction that, in the context of an investigation, may constitute relevant evidence.
Verbatim passages from section 2.4 of the report.
Source: Insight LAC, en base a OCDE (2019), UNCTAD, DETL y ECDE (2024), Lin et al. (2017) y Messina (2015), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Argentina's digital channel produces traceability that the State already uses through permanent information regimes, tax withholding and collection, and cooperation mechanisms with platforms.
For analytical purposes, these responses can be grouped into three traditional schemes: i) immunity or broad limitation of liability; ii) liability conditional on actual knowledge of the unlawfulness and a subsequent failure to act diligently; and iii) strict or joint liability.
The intermediary liability models identified in the report, side by side. The detail of each one unfolds below.
| Dimension | Immunity or broad limitation of liabilitySee on the timeline | Liability based on actual knowledgeSee on the timeline | Strict or joint liabilitySee on the timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| What it establishes | …no provider of an interactive service could be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another content provider. | This model limits the intermediary's liability for third-party content as long as it has no actual knowledge of its unlawfulness. | Under this scheme, liability does not depend on proving fault or intent on the part of the party concerned… |
| Where it applies |
|
|
|
| Situation in Argentina | Not covered in the report |
|
|
| Dimension | Immunity or broad limitation of liability | Liability based on actual knowledge | Strict or joint liability |
|---|---|---|---|
| When the platform is liable | Subsequent case law extended that immunity to cover virtually any claim arising from third-party content, with narrow exceptions for federal criminal law, intellectual property and/or sex trafficking. | Liability may arise when, having acquired that knowledge under the conditions set by the applicable regime, the intermediary fails to act diligently. | However, there are sector-specific regimes (especially in consumer protection, safety and product liability) that may reach certain operators when, because of the functions they actually perform, they are considered suppliers. |
| Monitoring obligation | Not covered in the report | The scheme seeks to encourage a response to specific identified content without imposing a general obligation of prior supervision over all the activities carried out by users. … In turn, Article 8 provides that no general obligation may be imposed on providers to monitor the information they transmit or store, or to actively seek facts indicating illegal activity. | Not covered in the report |
| Effects noted in the report | Kosseff (2019) describes it as the 26 words that "created the internet", because they dismantled the Stratton Oakmont double standard and gave legal certainty both to non-intervention and to active good-faith moderation. | Due diligence, by contrast, distributes control obligations according to the role each actor plays in each type of transaction, which keeps open platforms from reacting by shutting out sellers with a shorter track record, who are usually the ones that depend on the digital channel to join the formal market. | In the case of e-commerce, general joint liability encourages reducing the number of sellers admitted and raising barriers to entry, since each new seller adds legal risk for the platform. |
The conditional liability regime for intermediaries.
Comparative law shows a trend towards distinguishing the intermediary's own liability from liability arising from acts carried out by third parties through its services. In the European Union, this criterion, initially set out in the E-Commerce Directive of 2000, is currently governed by the Digital Services Act, which maintains a conditional limitation of liability and the ban on imposing general monitoring obligations, while adding specific duties of diligence, traceability and cooperation. In Argentina, the Supreme Court held in Rodríguez, María Belén v. Google Inc. that the liability of search engines for third-party content is fault-based and may arise when the intermediary acquires actual knowledge of the unlawfulness of specifically identified content and then fails to act with due diligence. Given the particular subject matter of that precedent, its doctrine should not be automatically extended to all e-commerce platforms or to their users' customs obligations.
Consequently, attributing liability to intermediaries should be assessed according to the function they actually perform, their degree of involvement, their knowledge of the irregularity and their concrete ability to prevent or remedy it.
Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.1, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
The liability of digital intermediaries is an application of the general principles of tort law to an environment in which an actor can organize or facilitate exchanges between third parties without necessarily being the author of the content, the seller of the product or a party to the transaction.
How different jurisdictions answered the question of who is liable for what is sold or posted on a platform. Hollow milestones are bills that did not prosper or are still pending.
Hollow: did not prosper or pending
CompuServe, likened to a passive library
US · Precedent
Ruling
…CompuServe, likened in 1991 to a passive library and therefore exempted.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
US · Precedent
Ruling
The immediate precedent was the Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. ruling (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1995), which held that Prodigy, by exercising editorial control over its message boards, had to be treated as a publisher and bear full liability for defamatory posts by third parties (as distinct from CompuServe, likened in 1991 to a passive library and therefore exempted).
Communications Decency Act, Section 230
US · Immunity or broad limitation of liability
In force
The US Congress responded with the Communications Decency Act of 1996, whose Section 230 established that no provider of an interactive service could be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another content provider.
E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC)
European Union · Liability based on actual knowledge
Reformulated
The initial formulation of this scheme in European law was found in the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 (Directive 2000/31/EC), and it is currently governed by the Digital Services Act.
Law No. 20,435
Chile · Liability based on actual knowledge
In force
In Chile, Law No. 20,435 of 2010, which amended Law No. 17,336 on Intellectual Property, introduced a safe harbour regime for internet service providers with regard to copyright. This regime delimits their liability and sets specific conditions for its application, including acting diligently in response to the notices and court orders provided for.
E-Commerce Law No. 4,868
Paraguay · Liability based on actual knowledge
In force
In Paraguay, E-Commerce Law No. 4,868 of 2013 established a liability limitation regime for intermediary service providers, subject to the conditions and procedures set out in the law itself.
Rodríguez, María Belén v. Google Inc. (Supreme Court)
Argentina · Liability based on actual knowledge
Ruling
In Rodríguez, María Belén v. Google Inc. (damages), the Supreme Court ruled out applying a strict liability standard to search engines and held that they have no general obligation to monitor, supervise or oversee content created and published by third parties. According to the ruling, fault-based liability may arise when the search engine acquires actual knowledge of the unlawfulness of specifically identified content and nonetheless fails to diligently take the measures needed to correct or end the harmful situation.
Passed by the Senate
Argentina · Liability based on actual knowledge
Did not prosper
In October 2016, the Senate passed a bill resulting from the joint consideration of files S-1865/15 and S-942/16, which provided for a limitation of liability for technology intermediaries and ruled out a general monitoring obligation. Although it obtained a committee report in the Chamber of Deputies in 2017, the initiative did not complete the legislative process and lapsed. In December 2016, a different initiative was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, File 5771-D-2016, which proposed a hybrid system of private notice for manifestly unlawful content and a court order for all other content, and which did not become law either.
Digital Services Act (EU Regulation 2022/2065)
European Union · Liability based on actual knowledge
In force
Article 6 of this Regulation establishes a conditional limitation of liability for hosting services where the provider has no actual knowledge of the illegal activity or content or, upon obtaining such knowledge, acts expeditiously to remove it or disable access to it. In turn, Article 8 provides that no general obligation may be imposed on providers to monitor the information they transmit or store, or to actively seek facts indicating illegal activity.
Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products
European Union · Strict or joint liability
In force
In the European Union, Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on liability for defective products provides, under specific conditions, for the possible liability of online platform providers when no economic operator established in the Union can be identified and the requirements set out in the Directive itself and in the Digital Services Act are met.
Bill 2818-D-2025
Argentina · Liability based on actual knowledge
Pending
More recently, in May 2025, Bill 2818-D-2025 was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. It takes the latter bill as a precedent and proposes to regulate the liability of intermediaries for unlawful content generated by third parties. The initiative establishes the absence of a general monitoring obligation, links liability to the acquisition of actual knowledge and a subsequent failure to act diligently, and provides that the voluntary adoption of preventive moderation tools should not deprive the intermediary of the liability limitation regime. As of October 2026, this bill is still pending and is not law in force.
Bill 7089-D-2025
Argentina · Strict or joint liability
Pending
…in Argentina, in January 2026, Bill 7089-D-2025 was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, aimed at updating consumer protection in e-commerce and strengthening control over the sale of imported goods. The initiative shares goals that this report considers relevant, such as seller traceability and control over the origin of imported goods. However, it provides for platforms to be jointly liable with the supplier towards the consumer, as well as in relation to certain customs infractions and unpaid import duties, with the possibility of exemption only if they prove compliance with a number of obligations that exceed the verification capacities of an intermediary and shift onto platforms control functions that belong to State agencies.
Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.1, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
These mechanisms do not assign liability for the acts of third parties; instead, they draw on the structural capacity of digital commerce to generate verifiable information about the transactions it intermediates.
This is the direction taken by the most advanced regulatory frameworks internationally, from the European DSA to the OECD model rules for digital platforms, and one that Argentina has been building incrementally since 2018.
Twelve rules governing collections, payments and tax information in the digital channel, and how some repeal or amend others. Focus on a rule to see which others it is related to.
RG 140/1998
AFIP · Payments (withholding)
Repealed since Sep 2024
Card payment processors. VAT withholding on settlements made to merchants for credit, debit or purchase card collections.
Relationships
RG 3685/2014
AFIP · Tax (information)
In force, amended
VAT-registered taxpayers. Monthly reporting of purchases and sales. Title I was rendered ineffective for taxpayers included in the Digital VAT Ledger, according to the applicable schedule.
RG 4011-E/2017
AFIP · Payments (withholding)
Repealed since Sep 2024
Card payment processors. Income tax withholding on settlements made to merchants for credit, debit or purchase card collections.
Relationships
RG 4240/2018
AFIP · Tax (collection)
In force
Payment intermediaries abroad. VAT collection on digital services provided by foreign suppliers to users in Argentina.
RG 4614/2019 — Título I
AFIP · Payments (information)
In force
Payment aggregators and facilitators. Monthly report to ARCA: CUIT, line of business, CBU/CVU, total amount of transactions and fees for each affiliated seller.
RG 4614/2019 — Título II
AFIP · Payments (information)
In force, amended
Operators of virtual accounts and wallets (PSPs). Monthly report to ARCA: list of accounts, inflows, outflows and balances of users above the thresholds in force.
Relationships
RG 4622/2019
AFIP · Payments (withholding)
Repealed since Sep 2024
Operators of electronic payment and collection services. VAT and income tax withholding on settlements made to sellers on digital platforms.
Relationships
Comunicación A 7769/2023
BCRA · Infrastructure (interoperability)
In forceFrom Feb 2024
Acquirers, aggregators and digital wallets. Every QR code that accepts credit cards must accept payment from any registered interoperable digital wallet, regardless of its brand.
RG 5319/2023
AFIP · Tax (collection)
In force, amended
Owners and operators of digital platforms (marketplaces). VAT collection at differential rates (1%–8%) depending on the seller's tax status; lookup in the ARCA register valid for 30 calendar days.
Relationships
RG 5554/2024
ARCA (formerly AFIP) · Payments (repeal)
In forceFrom Sep 2024
Repeals RG 140/1998, 4011/2017 and 4622/2019. Eliminates the VAT and income tax withholding regimes on electronic collections as of September 1, 2024.
RG 5794/2025
ARCA (formerly AFIP) · Tax (collection)
In forceFrom Dec 2025
Owners and operators of digital platforms (marketplaces). Updates the habitualness thresholds for uncategorized taxpayers: 10 or more monthly transactions for an amount of $750,000 or more, or 4 or more monthly transactions in each month of a four-month period with a cumulative amount ≥ $750,000.
Relationships
RG 5804/2025
ARCA (formerly AFIP) · Payments (information)
In forceFrom May 2026
Operators of virtual accounts, wallets and PSPs that offer payment accounts. Expands and breaks down the information required under Title II of RG 4614; expressly includes PSPs with payment accounts.
Relationships
Source: Insight LAC, elaboración propia (Tabla 3), Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Unlike the two previous levels, cooperation mechanisms are triggered by complaints or court cases, and their scope depends on the will of the parties rather than on an ongoing regulatory obligation.
What cooperation between platforms and public agencies produces. Each figure states its period and scope: they are not added up or compared with one another.
Joint operations with authorities and brands. Regional figures, not only for Argentina; the report does not state their source. Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.2, 2026.
Protocol for sharing information on suspicious listings. Source: Infobae, 2026.
Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.2, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
The different types of informality and illegality also have different levels of traceability and, therefore, different public policy challenges.
The certifications that condition the legal sale of products, the controls that no longer apply to courier shipments and the information flows the State could cross-check to detect covert commercial use.
OECD PMR indicator
A 0 to 6 scale that measures the distance from international best practice in competition.
| Argentina2014 and 2016 | 3.11 |
|---|---|
| Mexico2018 | 2.10 |
| Chile2018 | 1.58 |
Argentina has historically maintained one of the most restrictive regulatory frameworks in Latin America in terms of market access.
Five areas with mandatory certification or registration
Selling a broad and heterogeneous set of product categories in the Argentine market requires prior accreditation before specialized technical agencies, whose involvement is a condition of legality and not a mere formality.
Electrical safety
Health products
Toy safety
Safety auto parts
Telecommunications equipment
On top of these categories come plant protection products, agrochemicals and fertilizers, whose registration with SENASA is a necessary condition for their sale.
What ARCA's General Resolution 5884/2026 changed
Technical agency interventions that used to work as entry controls
| Control | Before | Since RG 5884/2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Prior ANMAT intervention for cosmetics and personal-use medical devices | Before: Required | Since RG 5884/2026: Exempt |
| SENASA free-circulation certificates for food and supplements imported by individuals | Before: Required | Since RG 5884/2026: Exempt |
| Electrical safety certification for electronic devices and type approval of spare parts issued by the Secretariat of Industry and Trade | Before: Required | Since RG 5884/2026: Exempt |
This differentiation could create negative incentives for the general import regime: as long as the certification, type-approval and documentation requirements of formal importation represent significant costs, the simplified regime for personal shipments could be seen as an alternative channel with a lighter regulatory burden.
In this respect, the reform does introduce a mechanism with significant tracing potential, since it requires a mandatory advance declaration through the Universal Postal Union's CDS system.
From inspecting parcels to identifying patterns
Information that already exists
Mandatory advance declaration (CDS)
The postal operator must send it to ARCA before the goods physically arrive. It is required by RG 5884/2026.
Sales data that platforms already report monthly to ARCA
Systematic cross-checking within ARCA
If those two information flows are systematically cross-checked within ARCA, it becomes possible to detect patterns of inconsistency between what a person declares they are importing for personal use and what they might later sell on a domestic platform.
What is missingThe problem is not a lack of data (which already exists through information regimes and specific cooperation mechanisms) but the lack of an analytical architecture that links it.
What it would make possible
Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.3, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
Source: OCDE, Panorama de las administraciones públicas América Latina y el Caribe 2020, 2020
Source: ARCA, Resolución General 5884/2026. Régimen de envíos postales, 2026
The challenge is to build the institutional capacity to integrate it with customs and tax records and thus focus enforcement on the highest-risk operators and transactions.
Based on the analysis developed in the previous sections, four public policy lines can be identified that could strengthen the contribution of digital commerce to the formalization and transparency ecosystem in Argentina, without regressive effects on the base of small sellers that currently use the channel.
Each line answers three questions: what the State gains, what it requires or what costs it entails, and who carries it out.
Line 1
One of the main problems in tackling irregular trade is the capacity to integrate the data that already exists. The information regimes in force (in particular, RG 4614/2019 with respect to the parties expressly covered by it) and certain specific exchange schemes produce flows of transactional information that are currently processed in a fragmented way and are not always systematically integrated with the import records available at the General Customs Directorate. That fragmentation limits the State's ability to build a consolidated picture of the flow of goods from import to final sale, particularly in the courier regime, which combines high volume, low declared unit value and difficulties for systematic control. The advance declaration with the recipient's tax identifier introduced by RG 5884/2026 is an input that, integrated within the State with the information it already receives from the parties obliged under the applicable regimes, could help detect inconsistencies between what is declared as an import for personal use and its eventual subsequent sale.
The recommendation therefore aims to improve interoperability among State agencies with respect to the information they already receive under the regimes in force. Under common protocols on format, purpose, frequency, security and data protection, ARCA, the General Customs Directorate and the competent technical agencies could integrate the information they already hold on importers, sellers, frequency, quantities and transactions to build cumulative risk profiles by CUIT, category and origin. This would make it possible to move from controlling individual parcels to identifying patterns of possible commercial use of regimes intended for personal consumption.
Another problem identified is the requirement, in some regimes in force in Latin America, for the prior consent of the sector regulator, which operates as a condition for customs clearance. This creates a logistical bottleneck that translates into delivery delays, storage costs and a negative experience for the consumer, who in most cases is unaware, at the time of purchase, that a regulatory step is pending; that friction ends up encouraging informal purchasing channels that escape both the technical control of the sector regulator and the fiscal control of the tax authority.
Replacing prior physical control with subsequent electronic oversight, based on the information the system itself already generates, would be a viable solution. In other words, it would be a “sworn statement” to be completed after customs clearance, instead of operating as a precondition for the release of the goods. This option does not remove the requirement to declare the equipment's conformity, but decouples it from the physical flow of goods: registration must be completed before the product is first used, but it can be checked electronically once the parcel has been released, which is precisely the kind of architecture that makes it possible to build cumulative risk profiles instead of intervening in every shipment at the border.
The proposal builds on precedents such as Argentina's “Door to Door” regime, which allows a simplified declaration of contents and online payment of duties between the product's arrival in the country and its final delivery, and the Mexican Official Standards (NOM), which speed up the release of products for personal use once compliance with labelling and information requirements has been verified, without additional discretionary controls at the border.
Implementation conditions. In a first stage, interoperability should be limited to the internal integration of the information that State agencies already receive under the regimes in force. Additional information provided through voluntary cooperation agreements should be used exclusively for the expressly defined purposes.
Every request for or exchange of information should have a sufficient legal basis and respect the criteria of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality. The protocols should identify the data strictly needed, the parties authorized to access it, the permitted purposes, retention periods and the applicable security measures. They should also take into account the economic, technical and operational capacities of the different intermediaries and establish safeguards to protect personal data, tax secrecy, confidential business information, trade secrets and intellectual property rights.
Voluntary agreements should expressly state that they are limited in scope and do not create new liabilities. Any more onerous future obligation would require a specific rule, a prior impact assessment and general, objective and technologically neutral criteria, applicable under equivalent conditions to comparable operators. In other words, a platform's technical capacity to generate or process information should not, on its own, be considered sufficient grounds for imposing new legal obligations on it. In this way, cooperation could strengthen the State's risk management without shifting onto private intermediaries functions that belong to the State's police power.
Line 2
Four concrete mechanisms for the certification system as a whole
Given the difference between the certifications required under the general regime and under the simplified courier regime, there may be an incentive to use a regime designed for personal consumption as a commercial supply route. The policy would not be to indiscriminately tighten the courier regime or to remove all the requirements of the general regime, but to align the incentives between the two: detect habitualness, establish automatic transitions between regimes and prevent the regulatory differential from rewarding splitting. This assessment should cover sales facilitated by foreign platforms and possible shifts towards less traceable channels. Equivalent obligations should be considered for operators performing comparable functions, together with viable cross-border compliance mechanisms and measures adapted to the information actually available in each channel. On the one hand, it is proposed that the “sworn statement” procedure for products for personal use be free of charge, as a principle that should extend to any new procedure involving marketplaces in the issuance of type approval, even under an experimental regime, since, for products with a low unit value, any administrative fee could exceed the value of the product itself, making the formal route unviable and directly encouraging informality; the same principle already operates in the simplified tariff regimes adopted by China and Argentina. On the other hand, it is recommended to keep a personal-use criterion based on quantity and frequency compatible with that purpose (without constituting a commercial act), rather than an alternative that replaces it with a value limit tied to the tax exemption regime. As a complement, it is proposed that displaying the type-approval code, when available, for higher-risk products work as a double-check mechanism, applicable only to the range of products that actually warrants monitoring by the regulatory authority.
which eliminates duplicate technical testing for products already certified in jurisdictions with equivalent standards.
breaking up the de facto institutional monopolies that concentrate the procedure in a single State or professional actor and create bottlenecks with direct effects on the costs and time of market access.
This does not mean eliminating safety standards, but identifying when a regulation ends up creating barriers to entry or exclusivity rents that feed parallel markets. A complementary policy is to eliminate mandatory periodic renewals for products that have undergone no technical changes, which impose recurring costs with no added safety value. At the regional level, the asymmetry of tax burdens and technical requirements between Argentina and neighbouring countries is a structural factor that no domestic policy can neutralize on its own. In that context, it is appropriate to promote dialogue within Mercosur aimed at the progressive convergence of technical standards and certification requirements for the product categories most affected by irregular trade. One case that illustrates this practice is the possible creation of a new category for imports for personal use: a “very-low-risk category” for telecommunications equipment. Rather than simplifying the type-approval procedure, the proposal is to eliminate it altogether for a limited range of products whose risk of harmful interference is, in practice, negligible, as with low-power mice and keyboards. Many of today's telecommunications products use mature, standardized radio-frequency technologies, for which even a simplified certification procedure represents disproportionate administrative friction given its nil contribution to risk management. Several precedents in comparative law support this logic: the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) exempts products for personal use from formal type approval and Peru exempts certain low-power devices from approval, while Brazil's own technical metrology body (INMETRO) already recognizes exempt categories when use is exclusively private, which confirms that this kind of proportionality-based exemption is not an isolated idea but a regulatory trend already established in different jurisdictions.
From the standpoint of institutional economics, informality and smuggling can be explained as rational responses by economic agents to incentive structures. When the price differences stemming from the regulatory framework exceed the expected costs of operating through alternative channels, the economic appeal of parallel markets increases. Consequently, the existence of these circuits cannot be attributed solely to enforcement failures, but also to the incentives created by regulatory design itself. In this sense, no control strategy will be fully effective unless it simultaneously addresses the structural conditions that drive operating outside the formal channel. Certification and type-approval processes, when excessively costly or lengthy, act as a barrier to entry that widens the price gap between the formal channel and alternative circuits, feeding back into the incentive for regulatory arbitrage. The recent trend towards simplification and recognition of international certifications is a step in the right direction, but its implementation is still fragmented.
Line 3
International evidence on reducing economic informality in Latin America shows that the most effective instruments combine productivity improvements, regulatory simplification, economic incentives and a gradual enforcement capacity. Within that framework, ARCA could develop simplified assistance mechanisms for sellers who reach the habitualness thresholds, reducing the administrative cost of first registration and making the corresponding procedures easier to access. Platforms could collaborate voluntarily by sharing general information, reminders and links to official channels, where technically and operationally feasible.
This collaboration should not include verifying sellers' compliance or general monitoring of their transactions, nor require collecting or communicating information beyond what the applicable regimes require and what is needed to achieve the intended purpose.
Line 4
A central limitation of the Argentine public debate on e-commerce and informality is the absence of official data to estimate what share of informal trade is currently channelled through digital platforms, social networks or street fairs, and how that distribution evolves over time. Without that data, any estimate of the impact of a regulation on formalization is conjecture. In 2023 the OECD, UNCTAD, the IMF and the WTO jointly developed a Handbook on Measuring Digital Trade that offers a standardized methodological framework for national statistical offices to incorporate digital trade into their national accounts and economic activity surveys, including specific guidance for capturing platform activity and the conversational channel. A concrete policy line could be to commission INDEC to produce an annual estimate of the distribution of retail trade by channel, following the methodology of the joint OECD-UNCTAD-IMF-WTO handbook and relying primarily on statistical and administrative information that is already available. Any collaboration by ARCA, CACE, platforms or other private actors should be voluntary and based on aggregated or anonymized information, under criteria of specific purpose, minimization, confidentiality and security. That collaboration should not grant general access to individual transactional data.
| Agency or actor | Strengthen customs intelligence | Redefine the incentives that fuel smuggling and grey markets | Support for the formalization of small sellers | Building a permanent monitoring system for digital commerce and formalization |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARCA | In charge | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | In charge | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation |
| General Customs Directorate | In charge | |||
| Ministry of Economy | In charge | |||
| INDEC | In charge | |||
| ANMAT | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | ||
| ENACOM | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | ||
| Secretariat of Industry and Trade | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| INTI | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Ministry of Human Capital | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| E-commerce platforms | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Argentine E-commerce Chamber (CACE) | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Other private actors | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Courier operators | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Postal Service | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation | |||
| Logistics operators | In coordination, cooperation or voluntary participation |
Source: Insight LAC, sección 3.4, Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce, 2026
The report is by Insight LAC and is titled “Contrabando: el rol del Estado y de las plataformas de e-commerce” (Smuggling: the role of the State and e-commerce platforms). Its authors are Ana Basco and Paula Garnero, directors of Insight LAC, and Lautaro Ramirez, associate at Insight LAC.
From public and industry sources that the report cites in every chart and footnote: CACE, INDEC, ARCA, UNCTAD, the Central Bank of Chile, Worldpay and ASIPI, among others. On this site, every chart and figure shows its source.
The report's methodological annex details the calculation: it starts from the ratio between gross output and sales in the trade sector according to INDEC's supply and use tables, applies it to the revenue declared to ARCA to estimate formal retail sales, and on that basis computes the ratio to the e-commerce revenue reported by CACE. The report itself warns that the result overstates penetration, because the denominator is built on tax records and leaves out informal trade. See the full methodology
Including the methodological annex and the source of every series. The report is published in Spanish. See the full methodology
Data, charts and logo for the press